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The 2018 Pan-Canadian Securities
Regulation Reference: Dualist
Federalism to the Rescue of
Cooperative Federalism
Johanne Poirier*

I. INTRODUCTION
In 2018, the impact of Canadian federalism on securities regulation
returned one more time to the Supreme Court of Canada. In its Reference
re Pan-Canadian Securities Regulation, the Court had once more to
clarify “who can do what” with regards to capital markets.1 But it was
also tasked with assessing the normative instruments through which
federal partners were attempting to act in a coordinated fashion. The
Court’s advisory opinion offers a relatively predictable interpretation of
the division of powers in economic matters, and more specifically, the
scope of federal jurisdiction over “Trade and Commerce”.2 However,
more significantly, the reference raised a number of fundamental
questions about the dominant and competing conceptions of Canadian
federalism, the role of courts in monitoring the behaviour of members of
the federation, the legal status of intergovernmental agreements, and the
fluid line dividing law and politics in the practice and theory of
federalism.
The central theme of this article is the way in which, in the 2018
Securities Reference, the Supreme Court relies on a maximalist and
traditional conception of parliamentary sovereignty to protect complex
*
Professor and Holder of the Peter MacKell Chair in Federalism, Faculty of Law, McGill
University: johanne.poirier3@mcgill.ca. I would like to thank Etienne Gratton and Catherine
Mathieu for their timely and meticulous research assistance, as well as Professors Sonia Lawrence
and Craig Scott for their insightful comments and highly pertinent editorial suggestions.
1
Reference re Pan-Canadian Securities Regulation, [2018] S.C.J. No. 48, 2018 SCC 48
(S.C.C.) [hereinafter “2018 Securities Reference”].
2
Section 91(2), Constitution Act, 1867 (UK), preamble, 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, s. 91, reprinted
in R.S.C. 1985, Appendix II, No. 5.

86

SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW

(2020) 94 S.C.L.R. (2d)

cooperative arrangements elaborated by the “political branches” of some
members of the federation.3
Part I briefly surveys how the Canadian federation was mostly
conceived — and still largely remains — structurally dualist, despite
pragmatic and jurisprudential evolution favouring cooperative
federalism. It recalls the constitutional saga regarding securities
regulation, including the invitation to cooperate addressed to federal
partners by the Supreme Court in the 2011 Securities Reference.4 It then
offers a review of the fundamentals of parliamentary sovereignty, and
argues that the Supreme Court of Canada — in case law leading to the
2018 Securities Reference — conceived of parliamentary sovereignty a
“sword” which members of the federation may always brandish to
unilaterally circumvent, or withdraw from, cooperative arrangements,
clearly reinforcing the dualist dimension of Canadian federalism.
Part II then analyzes how the Supreme Court reasoned, in contrast to
the Québec Court of Appeal, that intergovernmental executive decisionmaking mechanisms which constrain — in practice — the legislative
autonomy of participating provinces do not amount to constitutionally
inadmissible limitations on their parliamentary sovereignty. It does so by
evoking the potential use of the parliamentary sovereignty “sword” by
legislatures but also by transforming this pivotal instrument of dualist
federalism into a “shield” to protect collaborative schemes. The Court’s
approach facilitates the elaboration of complex arrangements by the
political branches, somewhat on the margins of the formal constitution.
This approach enables government — legislatures, yes, but mostly the
executives — to engage in para-constitutional engineering, both with
judicial blessing and protection from judicial scrutiny.
The final conclusion acknowledges that this development may
promote effective and “modern” federalism, but also underlines concerns
about the impact of “informal” arrangements on third parties, and on
accountability for executive action in a federal state grounded in the
rule of law.

3
This exploration is necessarily limited by the space available. The author is preparing a
parallel paper on the role of courts in the face of intergovernmental arrangements, notably those that
formally leave legislative sovereignty intact but that have substantive distorting effects on
legislatures’ actual capacity to exercise that sovereignty.
4
Reference re Securities Act, [2011] S.C.J. No. 66, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 837, 2011 SCC 66
(S.C.C.) [hereinafter “2011 Securities Reference”].
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II. REGULATING SECURITIES COOPERATIVELY IN
A DUALIST FEDERATION: THE CONTEXT AND THE ISSUES
The 2018 Securities Reference raises a number of significant issues
concerning the co-existence of both dualist and cooperative conceptions
of federalism in the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence. After sketching these
co-existing and competing conceptions (1.), this section of the paper
reviews the constitutional saga surrounding the regulation of capital
markets in Canada culminating with the 2011 Securities Reference’s call
for intergovernmental cooperation (2.).5 In response, several provinces,
one territory, and Ottawa designed a cooperative system whose
constitutionality was, once more, challenged before a Supreme Court that
seemed to wonder why some provinces were “back again”! (3.). Finally,
this section reviews the concept of parliamentary sovereignty (4.) and the
mobilization of this concept by the Court in two earlier cases in which it
seemed to be in tension with cooperative federalism (5.).
1. Dualist Federalism vs. Cooperative Federalism in Canada
Canada’s original federal architecture, adopted in 1867 was, and
essentially remains, formally dualistic. It is comprised of two orders of
governments, each endowed with its own autonomous legislative and
executive institutions. By contrast to the situation in the vast majority of
federations, constituent units do not formally participate in the federal
law-making process through a proper federal second chamber. Moreover,
normative action (the adoption of legislation and regulation) as well as
their implementation follow parallel — not interwoven — patterns.6
Hence, officially, Canada’s federal architecture is “dualist” and not
“integrated”.7
5

Id.
The Liquidators of the Maritime Bank of the Dominion of Canada v. The ReceiverGeneral of the Province of New Brunswick, [1892] A.C. 437 (P.C.).
7
With the exception of criminal law and the administration of justice, which is the only
instance of officially “administrative” federalism: see ss. 91(27) and 92(14), Constitution Act, 1867.
For a comparative analysis of the distinctions between integrated and dualist federalism in general,
see Johanne Poirier & Cheryl Saunders, “Conclusions: Comparative Experience of
Intergovernmental Relations in Federal Systems” in Johanne Poirier, Cheryl Saunders & John
Kincaid, eds., Intergovernmental Relations in Federal Systems: Comparative Structures and
Dynamics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015) 440-98, at 445-47 [hereinafter “Poirier &
Saunders, ‘Conclusions’”] and Johanne Poirier & Cheryl Saunders, “Comparing Intergovernmental
Relations in Federal Systems: An Introduction” in id., 1-13, at 5-6 [hereinafter “Poirier & Saunders,
‘Introduction’”].
6
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The original division of powers reinforced this dualist structure. Each
order of government was designed to fulfil rather independently a
number of functions. The judicial committee of the Privy Council, in its
decisive case law of the first 80 years of the Canadian federation, mostly —
but not exclusively — reinforced the dualistic vision of the federal
system put in place in 1867.8 Rather rapidly, however, it appeared that
despite explicit wording of the opening paragraphs of sections 91 and 92
of the Constitution Act, 1867, the principle of “exclusivity” needed to be
nuanced. Having given birth to the “watertight compartments” metaphor,
the Privy Council recognized early on the possibility of normative
overlap through an evocation of the double aspect doctrine.9
Gradually, with the advent of the welfare state in the 1950s, members
of the federation started to engage in intergovernmental schemes that
went against the grain of the classically exclusive division of powers.10
While courts continued to trace constitutional barriers between
“exclusive” competences, they also tolerated schemes whereby orders of
government could delegate, by legislation, executive and regulatory
powers to another order.11 The Supreme Court imposed basically one
limit to this pragmatic deviation from the dualist structure: a legislative
assembly may not abdicate its actual legislative power in favour of
another one12 (or possibly to another organ).13 This, it reasoned, would
amount to a modification of the division of powers without due regard to
8
Peter W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 2018 Student ed. (Toronto: Carswell,
2018) s. 5.3(c) [hereinafter Hogg, ‘Constitutional Law of Canada’”]; Noura Karazivan, “Le
fédéralisme coopératif entre territorialité et fonctionnalité: le cas des valeurs mobilières” (2016)
46: 2 Revue générale de droit 419, at 423-26. The author contrasts a “territorial” approach with a
“functional” one, a distinction that partly corresponds to the one drawn here, although it deals
more with the interpretation of the division of powers than a structural description of the federal
regime.
9
Hodge v. The Queen (1883) A.C. 117 (P.C.).
10
Marc-Antoine Adam, Josée Bergeron & Marianne Bonnard, “Intergovernmental
Relations in Canada: Competing Visions and Diverse Dynamics” in Johanne Poirier, Cheryl
Saunders & John Kincaid, eds., Intergovernmental Relations in Federal Systems: Comparative
Structures and Dynamics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 135-73.
11
P.E.I. Potato Marketing Board v. Willis, [1952] S.C.J. No. 31, [1952] 2 S.C.R. 392 (S.C.C.);
Reference re Agricultural Products Marketing Association, [1978] S.C.J. No. 58, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 1198
(S.C.C.); Peralta v. Ontario, [1988] S.C.J. No. 92, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 1045 (S.C.C.); R. v. Furtney, [1991]
S.C.J. No. 70, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 89 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Furtney”]; Fédération des producteurs
de volailles du Québec v. Pelland, [2005] S.C.J. No. 19, [2005] 1 S.C.R. 292, 2005 SCC 20
(S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Pelland”]. For a general discussion, see Hogg, Constitutional Law of
Canada, s. 14.3.
12
A.G. of Nova Scotia v. A.G. of Canada, [1950] S.C.J. No. 32, [1951] S.C.R. 31 (S.C.C.)
[hereinafter “Nova Scotia”].
13
R. v. Furtney, [1991] S.C.J. No. 70, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 89 (S.C.C.).
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formal amending procedures, as “legislative jurisdiction cannot be
assumed or given by consent”.14 The result of this intergovernmentalism —
sometimes reductively called “executive federalism”15— has been a
partial, informal and largely opaque transformation of the dualist regime
into an ad hoc partially integrated one.16
Moreover, particularly since the mid-2000s, the Supreme Court has
enthusiastically endorsed a somewhat idealized vision of “cooperative
federalism”, allegedly to soften the impact of certain interpretive
doctrines of the division of powers.17 “Cooperative federalism” is
mobilized to facilitate intergovernmental action so that distinct orders of
government may collaborate “to leverage their unique constitutional
powers in tandem to establish a regulatory regime that may be ultra vires
the jurisdiction of one legislature on its own”.18 The assumed virtues of
14
Nova Scotia, per Fauteux J., at 58 (see almost identical statement by Taschereau J. at 40;
see also Kerwin J. at 38, Rand at 47ff.)
15
Reductive because while cooperation is dominated by the executive branches, it is not
their sole purview. “Intergovernmental relations” may thus have an under-inclusive scope.
Meanwhile, “cooperative federalism” suggests a more harmonious state of affairs in a given
federation than might be the case. On these semantic challenges, see Poirier & Saunders,
“Introduction”, at 5-7. This said, Noura Karazivan aptly distinguishes between two meanings of
cooperative federalism. The first is an interpretive principle which alters traditional doctrines of
division of powers, so as to allow for a greater degree of legislative overlap. The second, she
describes as “executive” federalism, refers to the actual practice of intergovernmental relations:
Noura Karazivan, “Cooperative Federalism in Canada and Québec’s Changing Attitudes” in Richard
Albert, Paul Daly & Vanessa MacDonnell, eds., The Canadian Constitution in Transition (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 2019), 136-66 [hereinafter “Karazivan, ‘Cooperative Federalism’”].
16
“Partially” because the delegation of executive functions from one order to another is not
accompanied — by contrast to constitutionally integrated federal systems — by measures of
participation into the other order’s decision-making process: see Poirier & Saunders, “Introduction”,
at 6-7 and “Conclusions”, at 445-47.
17
See notably the discussion in Québec (Attorney General) v. Canada (Attorney General),
[2015] S.C.J. No. 14, [2015] 1 S.C.R. 693, 2015 SCC 14, at paras. 17-19 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter
“Long-Gun Registry Decision”] (Cromwell & Karakatsanis JJ. for the majority).
18
R. v. Comeau, [2018] S.C.J. No. 15, [2018] 1 S.C.R 342, 2018 SCC 15, at para. 87 (S.C.C.).
For a discussion of the impact of “cooperative federalism” on the interpretation of the division of
powers see: Jean-François Gaudreault-Desbiens & Johanne Poirier, “From Dualism to Cooperative
Federalism and Back?: Evolving and Competing Conceptions of Canadian Federalism”, in Peter
Oliver, Patrick Macklem & Nathalie Des Rosiers, eds., The Oxford Handbook of the Canadian
Constitution (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 391-413; Karazivan, “Cooperative
Federalism”Québec,136-66; Wade K. Wright, “Facilitating Intergovernmental Dialogue: Judicial
Review of the Division of Powers in the Supreme Court of Canada” (2010) 51 S.C.L.R. 625;
Johanne Poirier, “Souveraineté parlementaire et armes à feu: le fédéralisme coopératif dans la ligne
de mire?” (2015) 45 R.D.U.S. 47 [hereinafter “Poirier, ‘Armes à feu’”]; Johanne Poirier, “Le
fédéralisme coopératif au Canada: quand les registre juridique et politique jouent au chat et à la
souris” in Johanne Poirier & Nicolas Levrat, eds., Le fédéralisme coopératif comme terrain de jeu du
droit, Special Issue of (2018) 18 Fédéralisme et Régionalisme, online: <https://popups.uliege.be/13743864/index.php?id=1772>; Bruce Ryder, “Equal Autonomy in Canadian Federalism: The Continuing
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cooperation have also justified significant judicial deference to existing
cooperative schemes, even, in some cases, at the cost of administrative
transparency19 or in the face of arrangements that affect the rights of third
parties in ways that are constitutionally dubious.20
But the story is not so simple. While constitutional interpretation has
largely — but not univocally — abandoned the “watertight
compartment” metaphor, the very structure of the federation remains
undeniably dualist. Hence, all the “control mechanisms” of state action
follow a dualist pattern. Parliamentary oversight of executive action,
including committee work and control by Auditors General, follows this
“pillarized” structure. So does ministerial responsibility which is not
envisaged to respond to action taken by executives acting in concert. To a
large extent, this is also the case of judicial review of administrative
action, which takes place in parallel before distinct tribunals and courts,
depending on which federal or provincial public actor made a decision or
took an action whose legality is being challenged. Despite significant
evolution in the practice of federalism, and the interpretation of the
division of powers, this structure has formally remained unchanged.
Moreover, while courts encourage — or even, exhort — the political
branches to cooperate, they have resisted the invitation to judicially
condemn uncooperative behaviour, and have implicitly rejected anything
Search for Balance in the Interpretation of the Division of Powers” (2011) 54 S.C.L.R. 565; Eugénie
Brouillet & Bruce Ryder, “Key Doctrines in Canadian Legal Federalism” in Peter Oliver, Patrick
Macklem & Nathalie Des Rosiers, eds., The Oxford Handbook of the Canadian Constitution
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 415-32; Peter Oliver, “The Busy Harbours of Canadian
Federalism: The Division of Powers and Its Doctrines in the McLachlin Court” in David A. Wright
& Adam M. Dodek, eds., Public Law at the McLachlin Court: The First Decade (Toronto: Irwin Law,
2011), 167-99; Hugo Cyr, “Autonomy, Subsidiarity, Solidarity” (2014) 23 Constitutional Forum 20; Kate
Glover, “Structural Cooperative Federalism” (2016) 76:2 S.C.L.R. 45; Warren J. Newman, “The Promise
and Limits of Cooperative Federalism as a Constitutional Principle” (2016) 76:2 S.C.L.R. 67.
19
See Laforest J. in British Columbia (Milk Board) v. Grisnich, [1995] S.C.J. No. 35,
[1995] 2 S.C.R. 895, at para. 30 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Grisnich”], and discussion in Poirier, “Armes
à feu”, id.., at 77-78 and in Johanne Poirier, “Une source paradoxale du droit constitutionnel
canadien: les ententes intergouvernementales” (2009) 1 R.Q.D.I. 1, at 26-27 [hereinafter “Poirier,
‘Source paradoxale’”].
20
Dubious because intergovernmental agreements which were not properly incorporated by
statute were nevertheless treated as if they were laws of general application (erga omnes). See
discussion of Boucher v. Stelco, [2005] S.C.J. No. 35, [2005] 3 S.C.R. 279, 2005 SCC 64 (S.C.C.) and
of Fédération des producteurs de volailles du Québec v. Pelland, [2005] S.C.J. No. 19, [2005] 1 S.C.R.
292, 2005 SCC 20 (S.C.C.), in Poirier, “Source paradoxale”, id., at 23 ff. and in Poirier, “Armes à feu”,
at 76-78; Johanne Poirier, “Intergovernmental Agreements in Canada: At the Crossroads Between
Law and Politics” in Peter Meekison, Harvey Telford & Harvey Lazar, eds., Canada: The State of
the Federation: Reconsidering the Institutions of Canadian Federalism (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s
University Press, 2004), 425-62, at 443 [hereinafter “Poirier, ‘Crossroads’”]. The question of the
proper incorporation of an agreement is central to the 2018 Securities Reference: see infra, Part II.
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resembling federal loyalty or comity.21 In other words, legal barriers to
cooperation that partly flow from the dualist conception of federalism are
being judicially lowered. However, when federal partners do not wish to
cooperate, or no longer wish to do so, courts refrain from intervention
and reassert the autonomy of each federal partner to determine the nature
of its relations with the other members of the federation in a way that
reinforces the dualist nature of the federation.
It is in this conceptual waltz between dualist and cooperative
federalism that the most recent chapters of the constitutional saga
surrounding securities regulation unfolds.
2. The 2011 Securities Reference: An Invitation to Collaborate
For over 80 years, Ottawa has sought ways to regulate securities so as
to develop a “pan-Canadian” approach to the management of capital
markets.22 First the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, then the
Supreme Court of Canada, have consistently responded that securities are —
predominantly — under the constitutional jurisdiction of provinces.23
The last time was in 2011, when Parliament had drafted a bill which
basically purported to legislate all aspects of securities regulations,
including investors’ protection, the registration of issuers of actions, etc.
It provided for the creation of a national regulator and a process whereby
provinces could opt-in the federal scheme or maintain their own.24 This
generated renewed provincial resistance and led to advisory opinions by
the Alberta and the Québec Courts of Appeal, which both unanimously
concluded that the bill exceeded federal jurisdiction over “Trade and

21
See Québec (Attorney General) v. Canada (Attorney General), [2015] S.C.J. No. 14,
[2015] 1 S.C.R. 693, 2015 SCC 14 (S.C.C.); Jean-François Gaudreault-DesBiens, “Cooperative
Federalism in Search of a Normative Justification: Considering the Principle of Federal Loyalty”
(2014) 23:4 Constitutional Forum 1; Poirier, “Armes à feu”, Parts I.2 and IV.3; Jan Nato,
“Development of Duties of Federal Loyalty: Lessons to be Learned, Conversations to be Had” First
Prize, Baxter Family Competition in Federalism, 2019, online: <https://www.mcgill.ca/
law/files/law/2019-baxter_federal-loyalty-lessons-discussions_jan-nato.pdf> (accessed June 10,
2019). Reference re Pan-Canadian Securities Regulation, [2018] S.C.J. No. 48, 2018 SCC 48
(S.C.C.).
22
D. Johnston, K. Doyle Rockwell & C. Ford, Canadian Securities Regulation, 5th ed.
(Markham: LexisNexis Canada, 2014), at 634-62 cited in 2018 Securities Reference, at para. 9, and
in 2011 Securities Reference, at paras. 11-28.
23
Id.
24
The regime was broadly inspired by proposals elaborated in 1964, 1967, 1969 and 1994:
see 2011 Securities Reference, at paras. 11-28.

92

SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW

(2020) 94 S.C.L.R. (2d)

Commerce”.25 Ottawa then requested an advisory opinion from the
Supreme Court of Canada.
In the 2011 Securities Reference, the Supreme Court held that the
federal bill constituted a “wholesale takeover of the regulation of the
securities industry”26 and of provincial powers over securities. Most of
the bill dealt with, in pith and substance, the regulation of a specific
industry, that of local capitals market, rather than addressing a Canadawide economic problem. The Court recognized that local economic
matters have often taken a pan-Canadian or global dimension, but it
rejected the argument that the domain had “evolved from a provincial
matter to a national matter affecting the country as a whole” so as to put
it within the “Trade and Commerce” power.27
Nevertheless, while not explicitly pre-judging the issue, the Court
strongly suggested that while provinces had jurisdiction over the “day to
day” regulation of capital markets, the federal order could have some
legislative power to adopt measures designed to protect macro-economic
stability and counter “systemic risk” in Canada’s capital markets. This was
in 2011, only four years after the Canadian Western Bank decision in
which the Supreme Court hailed “cooperative federalism” as the “modern”
and “flexible” conception of the Canadian federation.28 Consequently, the
Court ended the 2011 Securities Reference by inviting the various orders of
government, each acting within its respective sphere of jurisdiction, to
cooperate.29 It emphasized that “each can work in collaboration with the
other to carry out its responsibilities”,30 concluding that:
Such an approach is supported by the Canadian constitutional
principles and by the practice adopted by the federal and provincial
governments in other fields of activities. The backbone of these
schemes is the respect that each level of government has for each
other’s own sphere of jurisdiction. Cooperation is the animating force.

25

Reference Re Securities Act (Canada), [2011] A.J. No. 228, 41 Alta. L.R. (5th) 145, 2011
ABCA 77 (Alta. C.A.); Québec (Procureure générale) v. Canada (Procureure générale), [2011]
J.Q. no 2940, 2011 QCCA 591, at paras. 75-89 (Que. C.A.).
26
2011 Securities Reference, at para. 128.
27
Id., at paras. 4, 116 and 128.
28
Canadian Western Bank v. Alberta, [2007] S.C.J. No. 22, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 3, 2007 SCC 22,
at paras. 31 and 42 (S.C.C.); Fédération des producteurs de volailles du Québec v. Pelland, [2005]
S.C.J. No. 19, [2005] 1 S.C.R. 292, 2005 SCC 20, at para. 15 (S.C.C.).
29
2011 Securities Reference, at paras. 130-134.
30
Id., at para. 131.
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The federalism principle upon which Canada’s constitutional
framework rests demands nothing less.31

The Court even mentioned the possibility of the adoption of a
“uniform” provincial act, and the delegation of regulatory powers to a
single pan-Canadian regulator.32 In a nutshell, to paraphrase, the not-sosubtle message was: “All of you, members of the federation, have
powers that are relevant to the proper regulation of securities.
Cooperation is the ‘modern’, ‘flexible’ way to deal with the issue. So, go
away, and sort it out!” The federal order, as well as some provinces
(notably Ontario and British Columbia) proceeded to do just that.33 They
went back to the drawing board, partly split the unconstitutional federal
bill into a federal Act and a provincial “model” Act, and elaborated a
complex cooperation scheme to bring about a “pan-Canadian” seamless
regulation of securities, which other provinces would be invited to join.34
3. The 2018 Securities Reference: You’re Back Again?
(And Why Are You Complaining)?
Québec, Alberta and Manitoba, again, resisted this new attempt to
restructure securities regulation in Canada. Québec seized its Court of
Appeal once more, seeking an advisory opinion on two issues. Four of
the five judges on the Québec Court of Appeal’s bench found the federal
bill to be ultra vires Parliament, unless a problematic aspect were severed
from it.35 The majority considered that the draft Federal Act dealt with
matters that fell within federal jurisdiction under section 91(2). However,
federal regulations adopted by the Authority are (like provincial ones)
subject to the approval (or rejection) of a Council of Ministers in which
provinces held a majority, and some provinces (those with “major”

31

Id., at para. 133.
Id., at para. 118.
33
At the time of the Reference, Ontario, British Columbia, Prince-Edward Island, New
Brunswick and the Yukon were part of the regime. Since then, Nova Scotia has decided to join:
Cooperative Capital Market Regulatory System, online: <http://ccmr-ocrmc.ca/news/> (accessed
June 14, 2019).
34
While the Supreme Court basically surveys four (or five) components, I have identified at
least ten: the scheme is described at some length in Part II.1, infra.
35
Reference concerning the constitutionality of the implementation of pan-Canadian
Securities Regulation, [2017] J.Q. no 5583, 2017 QCCA 756, at para. 44 (Que. C.A.) [hereinafter
“Québec Securities Reference”].
32
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capital markets), a decisive vote.36 This, for the majority, contradicted the
fourth and fifth criteria of the GM Motors’ test grounding federal
jurisdiction over the national dimension of trade and commerce.37 “By
granting veto rights to certain participating provinces with respect to the
federal regulations, the Regime negates the very necessity of panCanadian federal legislation to counter systemic risks on a national
scale.”38
By contrast, the Supreme Court found no objection with this form of
delegation. It held the entire federal bill — which is mostly aimed at
countering “systemic risk” with a potential domino effect on the
Canadian economy — to be valid without condition. Delegation of
regulatory and administrative powers to a joint organ is not problematic
in Canadian law, as we saw. The fact that this delegation occurs in the
context of the Trade and Commerce clause is no different. If Parliament
has jurisdiction over a part of securities regulation (which the Court
found it had), then it can choose if — and to whom — it delegates
regulatory powers. The fact that the delegates are provinces is no
impediment.39
Turning to the core concern of the present article, the majority of the
Québec Court of Appeal also considered that a major portion of the
cooperative scheme was unconstitutional as it involved inadmissible
constraints on provincial parliamentary sovereignty. Agreeing with the
dissenting judge, partly for distinct reasons, a unanimous Supreme Court
found no constitutional obstacle to the cooperative system.
Between the lines of the 2018 Securities Reference, one hears:
“We’ve already told you that you all have distinct but complementary
roles to play. We’ve invited you to cooperate. Some of you have. Others
36

Sections 76-79, Capital Markets Stability Act — Revised Draft for Consultation, January 2016,
online (pdf): Cooperative Capital Markets Regulatory System, online: <http://ccmr-ocrmc.ca/wpcontent/uploads/cmsa-consultation-draft-revised-en.pdf> (accessed June 1, 2019) [hereinafter
“Federal Act”]; Section 5.2 Memorandum of Agreement Regarding the Cooperative Capital Market
Regulatory System, signed between July 20 and August 4, 2016, online (pdf): Cooperative Capital
Markets Regulatory System, online: <http://ccmr-ocrmc.ca/wp-content/ uploads/moa-23092016-en.pdf>
(accessed June 20, 2019) [hereinafter “MOA”]. In French, it is called a “Protocole d’accord”. The title
given to an intergovernmental agreement has little relevance to its status. Terms (and their translation)
often seem to be chosen almost randomly.
37
General Motors of Canada Ltd. v. City National Leasing, [1989] S.C.J. No. 28, [1989] 1
S.C.R. 641 (S.C.C.), as discussed in Québec Securities Reference, at paras. 137 and 82-102.
38
Id., at para. 90.
39
2018 Securities Reference, at paras. 117-127. The Court also added that given the MOA,
Québec Securities Reference, s. 5.2, only groups of provinces could prevent the adoption of
regulation. Consequently, no single province had a “veto”.
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prefer not to, as is their prerogative, given that adhering to the
collaborative regime is not even legally mandatory. So, what is the matter
… again!? Why are Québec and Alberta seeking to prevent other
provinces from exercising, in collaboration with Ottawa, their own
competences as they see fit?”40
Indeed, in an era of enthusiastic endorsement of “cooperative
federalism”, who could be against cooperation? The Supreme Court
undoubtedly assumes that cooperation is positive. It certainly reflects a
significant practice elaborated by the various executive (and sometimes
legislative) branches. Lowering jurisdictional barriers to multiply
possible policy action — preferably a coordinated one — is, in the
Court’s own terms, “flexible” and “modern”. So why should
constitutional law be mustered to hinder cooperation that federal partners
are at pains to elaborate in the name of harmonized policy-development?
The 2018 Securities Reference confirms that the centralization of
powers (notably over economic matters) is not a foregone conclusion.
That both orders of government have a constitutional role to play and
should coordinate the exercise of their own jurisdiction. It is also a
significant addition to a rather consistent jurisprudential trend that lifts
constitutional impediments to complex intergovernmental schemes, at
least when governments want to cooperate. This new addition to the
trend is analyzed in Part II of the paper. This requires, however, a prior
foray into the contours of parliamentary sovereignty and of its impact on
cooperative federalism.
4. Parliamentary Sovereignty: The Essentials
Given the centrality of parliamentary sovereignty to the assessment of
the conformity of complex cooperative schemes with the Constitution,
this section briefly summarizes some essential elements of the principle
which will be relevant to the discussion in Part II.
Parliamentary sovereignty is part of the heritage of British
constitutional law which has known some adaptation on Canadian soil
(including the Charter, section 35, division of powers provisions, and
possibly one or more unwritten principles of the Constitution).41
40

Manitoba intervened solely to challenge the validity of the Federal Act.
John Lovell, “Parliamentary Sovereignty in Canada” in Peter Oliver, Patrick Macklem,
Nathalie Des Rosiers, eds., The Oxford Handbook of the Canadian Constitution (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2017), at 189-207; Jeffrey Goldsworthy, Parliamentary Sovereignty:
Contemporary Debates (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010); Han-Ru Zhou, “Revisiting
41
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The scope of this paper does not allow for an examination of the nature
of parliamentary sovereignty nor of its complex relationship with other
unwritten principles of the Constitution.42 For our purposes, it suffices to
point out that this “foundational” principle of the Westminster model of
government”43 has emerged “unscathed” despite the (sometimes erratic)
evolution from dualist to cooperative dominant conceptions of Canadian
federalism.44
Reduced to its core meaning, captured by Dicey, parliamentary
sovereignty basically means that in a Westminster model parliamentary
regime, legislators may adopt, amend and abrogate any law they see fit.45
Staying within the realm of Westminster parliamentarianism, the only
true (and somewhat paradoxical) limit to parliamentary sovereignty is
that sovereign assemblies may not relinquish their sovereignty. This
general axiom gives rise to a number of rules, five of which are relevant
to the 2018 Securities Reference in particular, and to the constitutionality
of cooperative arrangements more generally.
First, and this may simply be another iteration of the axiom itself, a
parliament cannot bind itself for the future, nor may it bind its successors —
that is, at least, not in matters of substance. In other words, in a
Westminster-style democracy, an elected assembly may always change
its mind.
Second, while an assembly may not bind itself and its successors with
regards to the substance of legislation or delegate its “primary”
legislative power, it may limit itself in “manner and form”46 to the extent
the ‘Manner and Form’ Theory of Parliamentary Sovereignty” (2013) 129 L.Q.R. 610; François
Chevrette & Herbert Marx, Principes fondamentaux: notes et jurisprudence, 2d ed. by Han-Ru Zhou
(Montreal: Thémis, 2016), at 241-411; Vanessa MacDonnell, “The New Parliamentary Sovereignty”
(2016) 21 Rev. Const. Stud. 13.
42
See Poirier, “Armes à feu”, at 80-92. See also Lovell, id., at 198. Jean Leclair and YvesMarie Morissette have outlined how only the principle of judicial independence seems to have taken
precedence over this structural principle: “L'indépendance judiciaire et la Cour suprême:
reconstruction historique douteuse et théorie constitutionnelle de complaisance” (1998) 36:3
Osgoode Hall L.J. 486.
43
2018 Securities Reference, at para. 54.
44
See Poirier, “Armes à feu”.
45
Parliament has “the right to make or unmake any law whatever; and, further, that no
person or body is recognised by the law of England as having the right to override or set aside
legislation of Parliament”: A.V. Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution,
8th ed., by Roger Michener (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1982) at 3-4. Ironically, Dicey himself
doubted the applicability of parliamentary sovereignty in the federal context, given the division of
powers. See: “Parliamentary Sovereignty and Federalism” in id., at 73-104.
46
See Han-Ru Zhou, “Revisiting the ‘Manner and Form’ Theory of Parliamentary
Sovereignty” (2013) 129 L.Q.R. 610.
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that it does so “in clear terms”.47 Hence, an assembly may adopt
decision-making processes, and be bound by them, until it amends or
repeals those procedures. Procedures may, however, amount to
inadmissible substantive limitations if they are so constraining as to
basically paralyze the ability of an assembly to change its mind. It has
been understood that these procedural limits may only be introduced by
norms adopted by the Assembly itself, primarily statutes.48 A key issue in
the 2018 Securities Reference is to what extent — and under what
conditions — may an intergovernmental agreement constrain the
sovereignty of legislatures.49
Third, a legislature may delegate its secondary (regulatory) lawmaking powers to the extent that it can control the law-maker and
(eventually) revoke the delegation. In Canada, this power of delegation
has been given a very broad scope.50 For instance, an assembly may
adopt the legislation of another order “by reference”, including future
amendments to be brought by the delegate.51
Fourth, the executive branch cannot bind the legislative one. The
sovereignty of parliament combined with the convention of responsible
government means that the executive is always subordinate to the
legislative. Of course, when a government enjoys a parliamentary
majority, its initiatives will almost invariably be honoured by the
assembly. In Canada, this has been held to be a function of the political
process rather than of constitutional law.52
47
See Reference Re Canada Assistance Plan (B.C.), [1991] S.C.J. No. 60, [1991] 2 S.C.R.
525, at 562 S.C.R. (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “CAP Reference”]. There is some academic debate, partly
reflected in an obiter statement in that same Reference (at 563) that only statutes of a “constitutional
nature” may actually introduce admissible manner and form limitations. This need not retain us in
the present context. In the U.K., manner and form limitations introduced by legislation have been
found to constitutionally limit the powers of the House of Lords: see Jackson v. Her Majesty’s
Attorney General, [2005] U.K.H.L. 56, [2006] 1 A.C. 262; Han-Ru Zhou, “Revisiting the ‘Manner
and Form’ Theory of Parliamentary Sovereignty” (2013) 129 L.Q.R. 610, at 622 ff.
48
British Columbia v. Imperial Tobacco Canada Ltd., [2005] S.C.J. No. 50, [2005] 2
S.C.R. 473, 2005 SCC 49, at para. 60 (S.C.C.).
49
See infra, section 3.
50
Hogg, “Constitutional Law of Canada”, ss. 14.1-14.3.
51
Coughlin v. Ontario Highway Transport Board, [1968] S.C.J. No. 38, [1968] S.C.R. 569
(S.C.C.). For a critique that this is an indirect way of circumventing the ruling in A.G. of Nova Scotia
v. A.G. of Canada, [1951] S.C.R. 31 (S.C.C.), see: Hogg, “Constitutional Law of Canada”, at
s. 14.4(b). However, the technique has now been normalized.
52
2018 Securities Reference, at para. 69: “Any de facto control that the executive may be
said to have over the legislature is irrelevant to our analysis”, citing Canada (Auditor General) v.
Minister of Energy, Mines and Resources, [1989] S.C.J. No. 80, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 49, at 103 S.C.R.
(S.C.C.).
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Finally, given the parliamentary nature of the regime, the assembly
may not “abdicate” its primary legislative functions in favour of a
person or a body that is not an integral part of the assembly.53
In concrete situations — as with the Securities Cooperative Scheme —
the border between acceptable delegation and abdication may be
contentious.
5. Parliamentary Sovereignty: A Dualist “Sword” in the
Cooperative Federalism Context
Parliamentary sovereignty has remained unadulterated from the
enthusiastic judicial endorsement of “cooperative federalism”. This is
illustrated by the 1991 Canada Assistance Plan Reference and the 2015
Long-Gun Registry Decision.54 In both cases, the Supreme Court showed
remarkable judicial indulgence in the face of unilateral uncooperative
action.
In the CAP Reference, the Supreme Court expounded a maximalist
conception of parliamentary sovereignty — maximalist in the sense of
basically ousting any substantial discussion of its impact on the federal
equilibrium. The Court took the position that uncooperative behaviour, if
it is “within powers”, may have political consequences but cannot be
sanctioned by courts. Individual orders of government remain free to
legislate as they please, without any obligation to pay attention to the
interests of other federal “partners”. Interestingly, for our discussion, in
the CAP Reference, the Court summarily rejected Manitoba’s argument
that the “overriding principle of federalism” should restrict the freedom
of a federal partner to unilaterally withdraw from a cooperative
agreement that had been in place for years.55 This is strong dualism,

53
West Lakes Limited v. The State of South Australia (1980), 25 S.A.S.R. 389, 397-398
(S.A.S.C.), cited in Reference Re Canada Assistance Plan (B.C.), [1991] S.C.J. No. 60, [1991] 2
S.C.R. 525, at 564 and in Reference re Pan-Canadian Securities Regulation, [2018] S.C.J. No. 48,
2018 SCC 48 (S.C.C.), at para. 60. The QCCA also referred to the case but to reach an opposite
conclusion to that of the Supreme Court: Québec Securities Reference at para. 80. See also Canada
(Attorney General) v. Friends of the Canadian Wheat Board, [2012] F.C.J. No. 706, 1 F.C.R. 518,
2012 FCA 183 (F.C.A.).
54
Reference Re Canada Assistance Plan (B.C.), [1991] S.C.J. No. 60, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 525
(S.C.C.); Québec (Attorney General) v. Canada (Attorney General), [2015] S.C.J. No. 14, [2015] 1
S.C.R. 693, 2015 SCC 14 (S.C.C.).
55
Justice Sopinka interpreted Manitoba’s question very narrowly: Reference Re Canada
Assistance Plan (B.C.), [1991] S.C.J. No. 60, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 525, at 567 S.C.R. (S.C.C.).
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favouring not only the autonomy of federal partners (and their respective
democratic polities) but of an egalitarian conception of Canadian
federalism.
Some 25 years later, after the Secession Reference shed light on
unwritten constitutional principles, including the principle of federalism,
the Long-Gun Registry decision by-and-large reasserted the CAP
Reference approach in a case regarding the abolition of the long-gun
registry. For the bare five-judge majority of the Court, the principle of
cooperative federalism does not impose limits on “otherwise valid”
exercise of legislative power. It cannot “limit the scope of legislative
authority or […] impose a positive obligation to facilitate cooperation
where the constitutional division of powers authorizes unilateral
action”.56 Moreover, insofar as registration falls under federal power, it is
immaterial that the “federal government’s ultimate goal may well have
been to prevent Quebec from creating its own long-gun registry”.57 In
other words, the purpose for which the legislative measure was adopted
— even if actually to hinder cooperation — is irrelevant if it fits within
the sphere of jurisdiction of the law-maker, cooperative federalism or
not. The ruling clearly reinforced the dualist dimension of Canadian
federalism.
These two leading cases illustrate that, where orders of government
refuse to cooperate, or no longer wish to cooperate and renege on
existing collaborative schemes, judges have shied away from finding any
obligation to act in good faith, to take other partners’ interests into
consideration and even less to enforce any duty to cooperate.
Components of the federation — holders of constitutional powers and of
a parcel of state sovereignty — can always legislate in a way that
counters existing cooperative schemes, or even to unilaterally denounce
them altogether. Indeed, armed with their “parliamentary sovereignty”,
the various legislative assemblies may free their respective legal orders
from “having to keep their promises”, implicitly in the name of
democracy.
In other words, in Canada, the power of an assembly to change its
mind lies higher in the hierarchy of constitutional values than the
imperative of abiding by one’s commitments to other partners in the

56

Id., at para. 20.
Even if this power (registration) is “ancillary” to the principal jurisdiction over criminal
law, see: id., at para. 38.
57
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federation, or of other forms of federal solidarity.58 In Karazivan’s
sagacious summary: “if you respect the division of powers, you do not
need to be nice”.59 The principle of parliamentary sovereignty was read
in “symbiosis” with the principle of (dualist) federalism but remained
unaffected by the principle of (cooperative) federalism.
By allowing members of the federation to “go at it alone” so long as
they are doing so within their (even overlapping) spheres of jurisdiction,
and so long as they are doing so through legislation, the Supreme Court
actually reinforces parliamentary sovereignty as an instrument of dualist
federalism. Each pillar can act in full autonomy, as sovereign, without
much consideration for the system in which it partakes. To put it bluntly
(!), parliamentary sovereignty is a dualist “sword”, a weapon which any
order of government can brandish to withdraw from cooperative
schemes.

III. THE 2018 SECURITIES REFERENCE: DE JURE VERSUS DE FACTO
SOVEREIGNTY IN THE FACE OF COOPERATIVE ARRANGEMENTS
This part of the paper critically explores the judicial interpretation of
the conformity of the cooperative scheme regarding securities regulation
with parliamentary sovereignty. It starts by expounding the complex
normative framework on which the securities cooperative scheme rests
(1.), as well as a contested decision-making mechanism (2.). This is
followed by a reflection on its compatibility with the conditions of
admissible manner and form limitations (3.) and on whether it amounts
to an abdication of sovereignty by participating provinces (4.). It
concludes that with the 2018 Securities Reference, the “sword” of dualist
federalism remains sharp, while it simultaneously becomes a “shield”
behind which the other branches can creatively restructure the federation,
largely protected from judicial oversight (5.).

58
Other federations give precedence to “pacta sunt servanda” above legislative autonomy.
On the impact of “legal cultures” and of the monist/dualist dichotomy with regards to the relation
between domestic and international law on the resolution of this intergovernmental tension, see
Kevin Munungu & Johanne Poirier, Les accords de coopération entre partenaires fédéraux: entre
‘sources du droit’ et ‘soft law’” in Isabelle Hachez, Hugues Dumon, François Ost, Michel
Vandekerchove, eds., Les sources du droit revisitées (Brussels: Anthémis, 2013) 887, at 909-11
[hereinafter “Munungu & Poirier”].
59
Karazivan, “Cooperative Federalism”, at 163.
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1. The Pan-Canadian Securities Scheme: A Complex Normative
Network
The “mechanics” of cooperation often rest on an intermingled web of
legislative, regulatory, contractual and soft-law instruments, a
phenomenon that is surprisingly under-studied, particularly from a legal
perspective. The collaborative scheme elaborated by Ottawa and (some)
provinces and territories following the 2011 Securities Reference is
particularly complex. While in its 2018 opinion, the Supreme Court only
explicitly lists four elements in its initial description of the system,60 the
normative puzzle is comprised of a far greater number of pieces.
Drawing a more complete picture provides a better understanding of the
complex “network normativity” at play.61
First, the Capital Markets Stability Act62 is a proposed federal statute
designed to prevent and manage systemic risk and to structure data
collection of national scope. It also creates criminal offences related to
financial markets.
Second, the Capital Markets Act63 is a “uniform” provincial statute
that addresses the provincial (“day-to-day”) dimension of securities
regulation. This “Model Provincial Act”64 is inspired by existing

60

2018 Securities Reference, at para. 21.
François Ost & Michel van de Kerchove in De la pyramide au réseau: pour une théorie
dialectique du droit (Brussels: Presses des Facultés universitaires St-Louis, 2002) defend this change
of paradigm, which is better suited to the complexity of norm-making in contemporary states than
Kelsen’s pyramid: Pure Theory of Law (Berkley University Press, 1967). See also Dave Guénette,
“L’architecture constitutionnelle: dimensions artistiques d’une construction juridique” (2017) 58:1-2
Cahiers de droit 33, at 40-43 [hereinafter “Guénette”]. For a metaphor of cooperative federalism as
complex games, including “Institutional Mikado”, see Johanne Poirier & Nicolas Levrat, “Le
fédéralisme coopératif comme terrain de jeu du droit: une introduction”, in Johanne Poirier &
Nicolas Levrat, eds., Le fédéralisme comme terrain de jeu du droit, Numéro Spécial de Fédéralisme
et Régionalisme, vol. 18, 2018, online: <https://popups.uliege.be/1374-3864/index.php?id=1736>
(accessed June 1, 2019).
62
Capital Markets Stability Act — Revised Draft for Consultation, January 2016, online
(pdf): Cooperative Capital Markets Regulatory System, online: <http://ccmr-ocrmc.ca/wpcontent/uploads/cmsa-consultation-draft-revised-en.pdf > (accessed June 1, 2019).
63
Capital Markets Act: A Revised Consultation Draft, August 2015, online (pdf):
Cooperative Capital Markets Regulatory System, online: <http://ccmr-ocrmc.ca/wp-content/uploads/
CMA-Consultation-Draft-English-August-2015.pdf> (accessed June 1, 2019) [hereinafter “MPA”].
64
The Québec Court of Appeal [hereinafter “QCCA”] described it as a “uniform” Act. For
its part, the Supreme Court uses the term “uniform” twice in its initial description of the
“cooperative system” (at para. 21), but it mostly refers to it as the “provincial model act” (MPA).
The terms “uniform” and “model” are, in this context, interchangeable.
61
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provincial legislation on securities and actually contains a large part of
the previous federal bill that the SCC had declared ultra vires in 2011.
Third are all the individual provincial and territorial statutes that will
have to be adopted following the model provided for by the MPA. To
adhere to the scheme, provinces must first abolish their own existing
legislation and regulations on securities, then adopt new statutes all
identical to the MPA. Under Canadian law, the MPA is not a statute at all:
it is a non-binding “mold” to which every participating province and
territory is to give legislative force either through a simple clause and the
annexation of the model, or by reproducing the model word for word.
Participants in the scheme commit to “use their best efforts to cause their
respective legislatures to enact or approve” the federal and model
provincial legislation.65
Fourth, a Memorandum of Agreement acts as the “fulcrum” around
which this normative network is structured. It is co-signed by ministers
and engages the executive branches of all participating entities.66
Withdrawal is possible with six months’ notice.67 Interestingly, in its
description of the “primary components” of the scheme, the SCC does
not list the MOA.68 It simply says that the “system” is “set out” in an
agreement. Arguably, the uncertain status of intergovernmental
agreements in Canadian law always makes their inclusion alongside

65
See ss. 10.1(b) and 8.1 and 8.3 of S. 5.2 Memorandum of Agreement Regarding the
Cooperative Capital Market Regulatory System, signed between July 20 and August 4, 2016, online
(pdf): Cooperative Capital Markets Regulatory System, online: <http://ccmr-ocrmc.ca/wpcontent/uploads/-23092016-en.pdf> (accessed June 20, 2019). This also applies to enactment by
Parliament of the federal statute.
66
Certain clauses may engage them in law — through some form of contractual
undertakings, while others will be mere political commitments. On the “scale of contractuality”
regarding intergovernmental agreements, see Johanne Poirier, “Intergovernmental Agreements in
Canada: At the Crossroads Between Law and Politics” in Peter Meekison, Harvey Telford & Harvey
Lazar, eds., Canada: The State of the Federation: Reconsidering the Institutions of Canadian
Federalism (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2004), 425-62, at 431-34. Courts have
recognized that (some) agreements may give rise to legally-binding obligations between the
executives who conclude them: Northrop Grunman Overseas Services Corp. v. Canada (Attorney
General), [2009] S.C.J. No. 50, [2009] 3 S.C.R. 309, 2009 SCC 50, at para. 11 (S.C.C.); Reference
re Anti-Inflation Act, [1976] S.C.J. No. 12, [1976] 2 S.C.R. 373, at 433 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Re
Anti-Inflation Act”]; Reference Re Canada Assistance Plan (B.C.), [1991] S.C.J. No. 60, [1991] 2
S.C.R. 525, at 551 (S.C.C.).
67
Section 5.2 Memorandum of Agreement Regarding the Cooperative Capital Market
Regulatory System, signed between July 20 and August 4, 2016, online (pdf): Cooperative Capital
Markets Regulatory System, online: <http://ccmr-ocrmc.ca/wp-content/uploads/moa-23092016en.pdf> (accessed June 20, 2019), s. 13.
68
2018 Securities Reference, at para. 21.
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more traditional legal norms problematic.69 Yet, it is simply impossible to
understand the arrangement without the MOA. Indeed, the Court
implicitly admits that the arrangement cannot be accounted for — nor
actually function — without this agreement and it amply cites its content
throughout the 2018 Securities Reference.70
Fifth, the MOA anticipates the conclusion of sub-agreements first for
the secondment of provincial personnel to the pan-Canadian regulator,
then for the permanent transfer of staff, assets and contracts from
participating provinces to the pan-Canadian regulator.71
Sixth, the MOA also specifies that pre-existing “transition funding
agreements” between Ottawa and several provinces — to ease their
transition into the regime — are to be maintained.72
Seventh, the scheme establishes a “Capital Markets Regulatory
Authority” [hereinafter, the “Authority”],73 a multilateral agency
mandated to implement both federal and provincial legislation and adopt
regulations in both the federal and the provincial domains related to
securities. The creation of the Authority entails the dismantling of the
securities regulator of each participating province and territory. The
Authority is to be based in Toronto, with satellite “offices” in
participating provinces.74
69
To give but two contrasting examples in Société des Acadiens et Acadiennes du NouveauBrunswick Inc. v. Canada, [2008] S.C.J. No. 15, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 383, 2008 SCC 15
(S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Paulin”], the Supreme Court cites an intergovernmental agreement (through
which New-Brunswick “rents” the services of the RCMP to exercise provincial police functions) to
bolster its conclusion, without referencing it or citing it amongst normative texts. By contrast, in
Fédération des producteurs de volailles du Québec v. Pelland, [2005] S.C.J. No. 19, [2005] 1 S.C.R. 292,
2005 SCC 20 (S.C.C.), the agreement was included in the list of Acts and Regulations cited by the
Court, as was the MOA in the 2018 Securities Reference.
70
The MOA is referred to 83 times in the 2018 Securities Reference.
71
Section 5.2 Memorandum of Agreement Regarding the Cooperative Capital Market
Regulatory System, signed between July 20 and August 4, 2016, online (pdf): Cooperative Capital
Markets Regulatory System, online: <http://ccmr-ocrmc.ca/wp-content/uploads/moa-23092016en.pdf> (accessed June 20, 2019), s. 10.1. Presumably those will have to specify which employment
law (federal, provincial, which one?) is to apply to both staff of the central office and the regional
ones. The MOA is silent on the issue.
72
Id., final clause not numbered.
73
The Authority’s website states that it was “incorporated” as a non-profit organization in
2015 as an “interim body”: <https://www.cmaio.ca> (accessed June 20, 2019). Even at the time of
oral pleadings before the Supreme Court, the Authority seemed to be in place, without an enabling
statute. Currently, the Cooperative Capital Markets Cooperative System (CCMCS) website does not
provide a postal address and the phone contacts refer to existing provincial regulatory commissions
or to a number in Ottawa: <http://ccmr-ocrmc.ca/contact-us/> (accessed June 20, 2019).
74
The MOA stipulates that “regulatory offices” will be placed in every participating
province. Since the Authority will also make regulations pursuant to federal law, its “territorial”
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Eighth, the Authority and its Board of Directors are to report to a
multilateral Council of Ministers [hereinafter “CoM”], composed of
every minister “responsible for capital markets regulation” of the
participating provinces and territories, as well as the federal Minister of
Finance. The Council is to be co-chaired by the latter, and, on a “two
year [sic] rotational basis, the responsible Minister from each “Major
Capital Markets Jurisdiction”.75 The CoM is an intergovernmental
mechanism par excellence, the very incarnation of high-level executive
diplomacy.76
Ninth, a range of regulations are to be adopted by the Authority
pursuant to the Federal Act, as well as the provincial ones, with final
approval by the CoM.
Tenth, the Authority is also to have adjudicative powers, through a
Tribunal to be set up by an eventual Capital Markets Regulatory
Authority Act.77 This Tribunal has the authority to make orders deemed
“necessary to address a systemic risk related to capital markets” (under
federal jurisdiction)78 or to ensure that individuals “comply with capital
markets law” (pursuant to provincial competences).79 It is to function in
reach will also extend to non-participating provinces. At this stage, we can only presume that this
will be handled from the head-office in Toronto.
75
Id., s. 4.1. Those “major markets” refer to provinces in which at least 10% of the gross
domestic product is composed of financial services: Ibid., s. 2.1(k).
76
To use the very apt analogy and analysis of Richard Simeon in Federal-Provincial
Diplomacy: the Making of Recent Policy in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1972,
new ed. 2006). Note that there are no specific rules regarding the accountability of the multilateral
CoM: ministers presumably remain responsible before their respective assemblies, through their
collective executive responsibility: Henri Brun, Guy Tremblay & Eugénie Brouillet, Droit
constitutionnel, 6th ed. (Cowansville: Yvon Blais, 2014) at 383-89.
77
See Capital Markets Stability Act — Revised Draft for Consultation, January 2016, online
(pdf): Cooperative Capital Markets Regulatory System, online: <http://ccmr-ocrmc.ca/wp-content/
uploads/cmsa-consultation-draft-revised-en.pdf> (accessed June 1, 2019), s. 2 and Capital Markets
Act: A Revised Consultation Draft, August 2015, online (pdf): Cooperative Capital Markets
Regulatory System, online: <http://ccmr-ocrmc.ca/wp-content/uploads/ CMA-Consultation-DraftEnglish-August-2015.pdf> (accessed June 1, 2019), s. 2. Up to now, it is unclear whether this is
meant to be a federal statute or a provincial legislation, though it is likely to be federal. All other
participants would have to delegate powers to the Tribunal, and likely incorporate its legislative
creation by reference (on this, see Hogg, “Constitutional Law of Canada”, s. 14.4). As of the House
rising on June 20, 2019, no draft bill bearing that title had been filed in Parliament.
78
Capital Markets Stability Act — Revised Draft for Consultation, January 2016, online
(pdf): Cooperative Capital Markets Regulatory System, online: <http://ccmr-ocrmc.ca/wpcontent/uploads/cmsa-consultation-draft-revised-en.pdf> (accessed June 1, 2019), s. 39.
79
Capital Markets Act: A Revised Consultation Draft, August 2015, online (pdf):
Cooperative Capital Markets Regulatory System, online: <http://ccmr-ocrmc.ca/wpcontent/uploads/CMA-Consultation-Draft-English-August-2015.pdf> (accessed June 1, 2019), ss. 89
and 52.
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French and in English, across Canada.80 The Tribunal will share its
jurisdiction with “regular courts”, in a complex way that cannot be
addressed within the scope of the present article, but which confirms the
“dualist” nature of the Canadian courts and review system.81
These various components are intricately woven together: federal and
provincial legislation refer to an agreement and to other legislation, the
main agreement refers to sub-agreements, the system creates multiple
and intersecting bodies, which are themselves further described in the
main agreement which acts as pivot to the entire regime. Even
identifying the “ingredients” of such a complex cooperative “machinery”
is a challenge.82 This detailed (and likely not exhaustive) enumeration
illustrates how pragmatic “network normativity” stands in contrast to the
pyramidal conception of law-making (and grounds of judicial and
constitutional review) that is fundamental to formal public law.83
80
Section 5.2 Memorandum of Agreement Regarding the Cooperative Capital Market
Regulatory System, signed between July 20 and August 4, 2016, online (pdf): Cooperative Capital
Markets Regulatory System, online: <http://ccmr-ocrmc.ca/wp-content/uploads/moa-23092016en.pdf> (accessed June 20, 2019), s. 9.4.
81
Hence, Capital Markets Act: A Revised Consultation Draft, August 2015, online (pdf):
Cooperative Capital Markets Regulatory System, online: <http://ccmr-ocrmc.ca/wpcontent/uploads/CMA-Consultation-Draft-English-August-2015.pdf> (accessed June 1, 2019),
s. 176, anticipates judicial review of the Authority’s decisions. A previous version of the Federal Act
excluded the jurisdiction of the Federal Court to review decisions by the Authority, see: Capital
Markets Stability Act — Draft for Consultation, January 2016, at s. 99 (removed), online (pdf):
Cooperative Capital Markets Regulatory System, online: <http://ccmr-ocrmc.ca/wpcontent/uploads/cmsa-consultation-draft-blackline-en.pdf> (accessed June 1, 2019). The current
version simply omits any reference to judicial review in the Federal Courts Act. Hence, the
determination of which court will have jurisdiction to judicially review a decision taken by the
Authority is likely to be rather complex. In principle, judicial review could always proceed before a
provincial Superior Court (as court of plenary jurisdiction, per s. 96, Constitution Act, 1867). But
which provincial Superior Court would have jurisdiction for a decision taken by a multilateral body
remains unclear. On the labyrinthine search for a court in the context of complex cooperative
regime, see Poirier, “Crossroads”, at 425-62 (text accompanying notes 49-50); Poirier, “Source
paradoxale”, at 27 and accompanying note 117.
82
Like the Supreme Court, the QCCA only refers to four of the 10 components identified
here, Québec Securities Reference at para. 44.
83
In each of the provincial, territorial and federal orders, the “pyramid” is topped by the
Canadian Constitution, underneath which are located, in “descending order”, parallel
provincial/territorial constitutions and quasi-constitutional norms, legislation and finally, regulations,
directives, etc. The validity of each norm depends on it being consistent with the instrument located
at a higher echelon in the hierarchy. This conception is, of course, highly formalistic and has been
challenged in the Canadian context, see Guénette, at 40-43. This said, while the “network” paradigm
better describes the complexity of both the emergence of norms and their interrelation, the fact
remains that their validity largely continues to be assessed on a hierarchical basis, as do other forms
of parliamentary and judicial accountability to which norms are subjected to: Poirier, “Source
paradoxale”, at 30-32.
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The system rather evokes a drawing by M.C. Escher in which ladders
simultaneously move up and down.84 The different ways of decoding
these interconnections and of identifying which components have legal
status and which do not partly explain divergent understanding of the
overall constitutionality of the system.85
2. The Role of the Multilateral Council of Ministers in Altering
Provincial Legislation
In this complex normative scheme, the multilateral regulatory
Authority will be overseen by a CoM composed of the federal Minister
of Finance and the ministers responsible for capital markets of each
participating province and territory.
Pursuant to section 4.2 of the MOA, the Council will “notably” be
responsible for “[…] proposing amendments to the Cooperative System
Legislation”,86 that is the Federal Act, the MPA, and the Authority’s
“Charter documentation”.87 It is also responsible for “approving
regulations” made by the Authority’s Board of Directors.88 While
members of the intergovernmental CoM are likely to prefer acting by
consensus, various voting mechanisms have been anticipated regarding
modifications of different aspects of the regime. The one that particularly
troubled the majority of the QCCA is set out by section 5.5 of the MOA
which concerned modifications to the MPA:
5.5 Voting on a Proposal to Amend Provincial and Territorial
Legislation
A proposal to amend the Capital Markets Act [the model provincial
act] must be approved by:
84
M.C. Escher, “Relativity”, online: <https://www.mcescher.com/gallery/back-in-holland/
relativity> (accessed 1 June, 2019). I am indebted to Nicolas Levrat for suggesting long, long ago, in
my queries about the many paradoxes surrounding intergovernmental agreements, this very apt
image.
85
This, in my view, also explained the divergent conclusions in the 5-4 split of the Supreme
Court in the Québec (Attorney General) v. Canada (Attorney General), [2015] S.C.J. No. 14, [2015]
1 S.C.R. 693, 2015 SCC 14 (S.C.C.): Poirier, “Armes à feu”, at 101-14.
86
Section 5.2 Memorandum of Agreement Regarding the Cooperative Capital Market
Regulatory System, signed between July 20 and August 4, 2016, online (pdf): Cooperative Capital
Markets Regulatory System, online: <http://ccmr-ocrmc.ca/wp-content/uploads/moa-23092016en.pdf> (accessed June 20, 2019), s. 4.2(c).
87
Id., ss. 2.1(e), 2.1(g) and 3(b). This “Charter documentation” (which should normally
take the form of an enabling statute) has not been made public yet.
88
Id., s. 4.2(d).
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(a) at least 50 [percent] of all members of the Council of Ministers;
and
(b) the members of the Council of Ministers from each Major Capital
89
Markets Jurisdiction.

This arrangement may be contrasted with section 5.6 of the MOA
which provides that the federal minister of Finance “will consult with the
other members of the Council of Ministers prior to any federal proposal
to amend” the Federal Act.90 It can also be contrasted with section 5.7,
which stipulates that “a decision to approve” certain “fundamental”
changes to the system “will require the unanimous approval” of the CoM
during the first three years, and thereafter of two-thirds of its members
(including Ottawa and the major markets).91 It is noteworthy that in this
context, the CoM is not called upon to vote on “proposals” to amend, but
directly to approve the changes.
The voting mechanism outlined in section5.5, its concrete impact and
legal significance received three distinct interpretations from the majority
of the QCCA, the dissenting judge and the Supreme Court. For the
majority of QCCA, the combined effect of sections 4.2 and 5.5 of the
MOA is that:
[a] participating province may not amend its own securities legislation
without the consent of the Council of Ministers; such a province is also
required to implement amendments dictated by the other members of
the Council. Since the minister of Finance of Canada is also a member
of the Council, we can even contemplate a scenario in which the
deciding vote regarding the amendment of the provincial Uniform Act
92
would belong to a member of the federal executive.

In other words, for the majority, amendments to the MPA (and thus to
the individual statutes modelled on it) actually requires the approval of
half of the participating entities. The federal Minister of Finance is
included in this tally. Any one of the provinces with “major markets”
could block amendments to the MPA that all other participating entities
think are warranted, in an area of exclusive provincial competence.
Conversely, provinces with “small markets” may be forced to adopt an

89
90
91
92

Id., s. 5.5 (emphasis added).
Id., s. 5.6 (emphasis added).
Id., s. 5.7 (emphasis added).
Québec Securities Reference at para. 62 (emphasis added).
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amendment to their own legislation, even if they disagree with them, to
the extent that the required majority within the CoM (including all
“major markets”) is attained.
Considering the purpose of the scheme as a whole, the interaction
between its various components and its overall practical effect, the
majority of the QCCA concludes that:
The admitted objective and uncontestable effect of the Regime are to
allow the Council of Ministers to control the amendments to the
Uniform Act, to impose such amendments on all participating
provinces and to impede any amendment from occurring without its
93
approval.

The dissenting judge and the Supreme Court rejected this conclusion
for reasons which deal both with the more formal aspects of procedural
limitations to parliamentary sovereignty and with the determination of
whether the voting scheme amounts to an abdication of legislative
authority in favour of a multilateral intergovernmental body. These
questions are examined in turn.
3. Is the Voting Scheme an Admissible Manner and Form
Limitation?
We saw earlier that manner and form limitation must be expressed in
clear terms, and must, a priori, emanate from the legislatures
themselves.94 Both criteria posed challenges in the 2018 Securities
Reference.
For the QCCA’s majority, understood in a contextualised fashion, the
overall scheme “delegates legislative powers to the Council of Ministers
and imposes real limits on the parliamentary sovereignty of the
participating provinces. […] The text of the MOA [in this regard] could
not be more clear.”95
The Supreme Court’s opinion on this issue is rather laconic. Its
rationale did not rest on any manner and form analysis,96 because the
93

Id., at para. 69.
See Section II, subsection 5, Parliamentary Sovereignty: a Dualist “Sword” in the
Cooperative Federalism Context.
95
Québec Securities Reference, at para. 61 (emphasis added).
96
Although it does state that “a legislature intending to bind itself to rules respecting the
manner and form by which the statute is to be amended must do so in clear terms”: 2018 Securities
Reference, at para. 51 (emphasis in the original) citing Reference Re Canada Assistance Plan (B.C.),
[1991] S.C.J. No. 60, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 525, at 561-64 S.C.R. (S.C.C.).
94
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Court considered that the QCCA had actually misread the terms of the
MOA. Read closely and with a textual approach, section 5.5 does not
actually require the CoM to approve amendments to the MPA. It outlines
a voting procedure to approve proposals to amend it. Given that the
adoption of the MPA itself is explicitly “subject to legislative
approval”,97 the Court concludes that the drafters understood that the
amendments themselves were the prerogative of the various provincial
legislatures.98 In short, there are two avenues here. If the MOA is clear, it
is in its recognition that legislatures “remain free to reject the proposed
statutes (as amended) if they so choose.”99 And if it is not clear, then the
first formal condition of “manner and form” requirements is not met.
But not only must admissible procedural limitations be very clear, it is
generally understood that they need to be introduced through a statute, or
at least an instrument having statutory value.
Schrager J.A.’s dissent draws the clearest conclusion from this tenet.
He shared the majority’s view that section 5.5. constituted “an abdication
of parliamentary sovereignty”100 of the participating provinces’
legislatures. Had it been included in a statute, it would have gone
“beyond allowable manner and form requirements”.101 There are limited
references to the CoM in both the Federal Act and the MPA: both provide
that the CoM is to be understood as it is defined in the MOA.102 While
both also refer to the role of the CoM in the adoption of regulations,103

97
Section 5.2 Memorandum of Agreement Regarding the Cooperative Capital Market
Regulatory System, signed between July 20 and August 4, 2016, online (pdf): Cooperative Capital
Markets Regulatory System, online: <http://ccmr-ocrmc.ca/wp-content/uploads/moa-23092016en.pdf> (accessed June 20, 2019), s. 3(a)(ii). Note, however, that paragraph only relates to the initial
MPA; it says nothing about future amendments.
98
2018 Securities Reference, at para. 25.
99
Id., at para. 50.
100
Québec Securities Reference, at para. 171.
101
Id., at para. 185.
102
See Capital Markets Stability Act — Revised Draft for Consultation, January 2016, online
(pdf): Cooperative Capital Markets Regulatory System, online: <http://ccmr-ocrmc.ca/wpcontent/uploads/cmsa-consultation-draft-revised-en.pdf> (accessed June 1, 2019), s. 2; Capital
Markets Act: A Revised Consultation Draft, August 2015, online (pdf): Cooperative Capital Markets
Regulatory System, online: <http://ccmr-ocrmc.ca/wp-content/uploads/CMA-Consultation-DraftEnglish-August-2015.pdf> (accessed June 1, 2019), s. 2.
103
See Capital Markets Stability Act — Revised Draft for Consultation, January 2016, online
(pdf): Cooperative Capital Markets Regulatory System, online: <http://ccmr-ocrmc.ca/wpcontent/uploads/cmsa-consultation-draft-revised-en.pdf> (accessed June 1, 2019), ss. 76-79; Capital
Markets Act: A Revised Consultation Draft, August 2015, online (pdf): Cooperative Capital Markets
Regulatory System, online: <http://ccmr-ocrmc.ca/wp-content/uploads/ CMA-Consultation-DraftEnglish-August-2015.pdf> (accessed June 1, 2019), ss. 206-207.

110

SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW

(2020) 94 S.C.L.R. (2d)

they are silent regarding its role in the legislative process. The latter is
only directly addressed in the MOA. For the dissenting judge, these
references are too oblique to constitute proper incorporation.
In contrast, the QCCA’s majority examined the system as a whole, in
a contextual manner, and considered that these legislative references
were, by “necessary implication” a form of legislative incorporation of
the CoM’s decision-making process. It adds that “[i]t is this legislative
incorporation that gives rise to judicial review in this case, and which
allows us to put aside the theoretical question of whether an
intergovernmental agreement is subject to judicial review”.104 In other
words, the majority took the view that the MPA (i.e., the future statutes
that any given province would enact based on the MPA) incorporated by
reference the MOA’s manner and form provisions. It was then able to
review those provisions and conclude that the content of section 5.5,
once indirectly enacted, would be constitutionally invalid as it would
amount to an abdication of provincial legislative power to an external
entity, a multilateral executive body.
Considering the overall interlocked scheme, the QCCA majority
concluded that:
the mechanism for amending the Uniform Act set out under the Regime
fetters the parliamentary sovereignty of the participating provinces and
is consequently unconstitutional. It subjects the provinces’ legislative
jurisdiction to the approval of an external entity (the Council of
105
Ministers), which is impermissible.

To return to our earlier metaphor, in taking part in the scheme, for the
QCCA’s majority, provinces were relinquishing their “dualist sword” to a
multilateral organ in a way that unconstitutionally limits their own
legislative sovereignty.
In a sense, the Supreme Court did not fundamentally disagree with
this analysis. A legislature may not abdicate its legislative power by
subjecting it to the consent of an external body. However, for the highest
court, section 5.5 of the MOA (and the entire scheme) does not — in
clear terms — intend to limit provincial legislative authority through an
instrument having statutory value.

104
105

Québec Securities Reference, at para. 75.
Id., at para. 55.
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4. Abdicating Sovereignty by Contract?: A Formalist vs. a
Contextualized Approach
The Supreme Court recognized that in practice, participating
provinces would likely follow the CoM’s decision regarding proposals to
alter the MPA (and, in its wake, the various parallel provincial statutes
that constitute the official legal norms).106 This said, the Court adds that
even if the MOA purported to impose amendments to the MPA unto
provinces, or, in some cases, to prohibit such amendment, it could not —
in law — actually have that effect. For the Supreme Court, the majority
of the Court of Appeal’s reasoning:
rests on the flawed premise that the executive signatories are actually
capable of binding the legislatures of their respective jurisdictions to
implement any amendments dictated by the Council of Ministers, and of
precluding those legislatures from amending their own securities laws
without the approval of the Council of Ministers. In light of the principle
of parliamentary sovereignty, this cannot in fact be the case […T]he
principle of parliamentary sovereignty is precisely what preserves the
provincial legislatures’ right to enact, amend and repeal their securities
107
legislation independently of the Council of Ministers’ approval.

In other words, political effects were found to be irrelevant by the
Court since provincial legislatures formally retained full legal
sovereignty to revolt against those effects, however unlikely such revolt
might be. In strong contrast, the idea that the system must be considered
constitutionally valid because, pursuant to parliamentary sovereignty,
partners are free not to respect their undertakings, seemed incongruous
for the majority of the QCCA in view of the combination of executive
control of the legislature and the practical consequences of having
abolished their own legislation and administrative apparatus to join the
interwoven pan-Canadian scheme:
It should not be presumed that the Council of Ministers will be
ineffective with respect to the role it plays in regard to the Uniform
Act, or that the governments of the participating provinces, including
their legislatures, will not bend to the will of the Council of Ministers.
On the contrary, it must be presumed that Participating Jurisdictions in
108
the Regime will realize their intended purpose.
106
107
108

Id., at para. 68 (emphasis added).
2018 Securities Reference, at paras. 61 and 67.
Québec Securities Reference, at paras. 69 and 70.
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With respect to a presumption of effectiveness, the QCCA majority
drew an analogy with the 2014 Senate Reference in which the Supreme
Court held that consultative elections of senatorial candidates altered
Canada’s constitutional architecture, despite their lack of formallybinding character:
[…] It is true that, in theory, prime ministers could ignore the election
results and rarely, or indeed never, recommend to the Governor
General the winners of the consultative elections. However, the purpose
of the bills is clear: to bring about a Senate with a popular mandate. We
cannot assume that future prime ministers will defeat this purpose by
ignoring the results of costly and hard-fought consultative elections. A
legal analysis of the constitutional nature and effects of proposed
legislation cannot be premised on the assumption that the legislation
109
will fail to bring about the changes it seeks to achieve.

The Supreme Court circumvents this aspect of the QCCA’s reasons by
not even referring to the Senate Reference. It rejects what it qualified as
an assumption that the legislatures would follow their respective
executive’s lead and thus that the voting mechanisms would “have their
intended effect”:110
[…] the principle of parliamentary sovereignty is precisely the reason
why we cannot rely on such an assumption. Any de facto control that
the executive may be said to have over the legislature is irrelevant to
111
our analysis.

In other words, the actual workings of the Westminster-style
parliamentary system, with a frequent (but not necessary) in concreto
control of the chambers by the executive that holds a majority of seats is
a political matter, not a legal one. What matters, for the Court, is one of
the “sub-rules” of the maximalist conception of parliamentary
sovereignty, pursuant to which assemblies are always legally supreme
irrespective of intergovernmental commitments or executive dominance.112

109
Reference Re Senate Reform, [2014] S.C.J. No. 32, [2014] 1 S.C.R. 704, 2014 S.C.C. 32
(S.C.C.), at para. 62, cited with approval in Québec Securities Reference, at para. 42 (emphasis by
the QCCA majority).
110
Québec Securities Reference, at para. 70, cited in 2018 Securities Reference, at para. 69.
111
2018 Securities Reference, at para. 69.
112
The Court also likely wanted to be consistent with its assertion in 2011 Securities
Reference that it was because provinces could always unilaterally withdraw from intergovernmental
cooperative schemes, that the General Motors provincial incapacity test was met, and thus that the
federal order had jurisdiction regarding the prevention of “systemic risk”: at paras. 118-119.
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The Court then insists that “even if the Memorandum actually
purported to fetter this legislative power, it would be merely ineffective in
this regard (since it cannot bind the legislature), and not constitutionally
invalid”.113 At this stage, I would just like to underline that this
“ineffective/unconstitutional” dichotomy should not be given broader
scope than was intended (or is warranted). It should not become a
postulate or a catchphrase. There is a risk that the Court’s pronouncement
could be understood to mean that any clause contained in an
intergovernmental agreement may, at worst, be “without legal effect”
rather than unconstitutional. The distinction — if it were to be retained —
should really be limited to the strict manner and form context.
The dissenting judge of the QCCA rightly observed that while
intergovernmental agreements may bind the executives who sign them,114
they are not a source of “law” of general application, unless they are
correctly incorporated into — or by — statute.115 He went one step
further, however, and would have excluded all intergovernmental
agreements from the scope of norms which may be held to violate the
Constitution.116 In his view, intergovernmental agreements are not “law”
within the meaning of section 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982.117
Consequently, courts should simply refuse to assess their
constitutionality.118 This assimilation between law of general application
in the context of agreements and the term “law” in section 52 of the
Constitution Act 1982 is questionable. An agreement does not have the

113

Id., at para. 67 (emphasis in the original).
For example: Northrop Grumman Overseas Services Corp. v. Canada (Attorney
General), [2009] S.C.J. No. 50, [2009] 3 S.C.R. 309, 2009 S.C.C. 50, at para. 11 (S.C.C.), cited in
Québec Securities Reference, at para. 180.
115
Notably Reference re Anti-Inflation Act, [1976] S.C.J. No. 12, [1976] 2 S.C.R. 373, at
433 (S.C.C.); Manitoba Government Employees Association v. Government of Manitoba, [1977]
S.C.J. No. 108, [1978] 1 S.C.R. 1123, 79 D.L.R. (3d) 1 (S.C.C.), both cited in Québec Securities
Reference, at para. 173. In reality, proper incorporation is what shifts the “contractual” dimension of
an intergovernmental agreement (binding inter partes) to its becoming a source of law (erga omnes).
It is frequent, however, for agreements that are not incorporated by statutes to nevertheless be
applied to third parties “as if they were laws”: Poirier, “Source paradoxale”.
116
As the MOA and its content were not law, Shraeger opined that the Court should either
rewrite the question or decline to answer it: Québec Securities Reference, at paras. 187 and 193.
117
This is so, he adds at para. 173 and accompanying note, even if the Supreme Court has
ruled that the term “law” in s. 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982 is not limited to “statutes, regulations
and the common law” as Dickson J. suggested, obiter, in Operation Dismantle v. The Queen, [1985]
S.C.J. No. 22, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 441, at para. 39 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Operation Dismantle”].
118
Québec Securities Reference, at para. 174.
114
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force of the law of general application without a statute.119 A number of
legal sources other than statutes have been held to come under the
purview of section 52.120
Immunising intergovernmental agreements from constitutional review
or concluding that if they run counter to constitutional norms they are
simply “ineffective” but not unconstitutional could have serious
implications, notably for third parties. One need only think of
intergovernmental agreements which directly or indirectly affect Charter
rights (deliberately or by inadvertence) or which circumvent other parts
of the written constitution (or even legislative norms). There have been
cases in the past where language rights have been significantly affected
by intergovernmental agreements.121 Imagine clauses in an agreement
that might violate Charter rights (an agreement on funding a social
program that is alleged to violate equality or section 7 rights for
instance).122 Surely, courts should not be prevented from scrutinizing
these instruments. A blanket immunization of the latter from judicial
review could allow unconstitutional practices to simply go unexamined
by courts.123
119
Reference re Anti-Inflation Act, [1976] S.C.J. No. 12, [1976] 2 S.C.R. 373, at 433 (S.C.C.),
discussed in Poirier, “Source paradoxale”, at 19-20 and Poirier, “Crossroads”, 425-62, at 442-43.
120
For example, it includes collective agreements concluded by public authorities as well as
decisions taken pursuant to the royal prerogative, see: Lavigne v. Ontario Public Service Employees
Union, [1991] S.C.J. No. 52, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 211 (S.C.C.) and Operation Dismantle v. The Queen,
[1985] S.C.J. No. 22, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 441 (S.C.C.). See also Noura Karazivan, “Cooperative
Federalism v. Parliamentary Sovereignty: Revisiting the Role of Courts, Parliaments and
Governments” in Alain G. Gagnon & Johanne Poirier, eds., Canadian Federalism and its Future:
Actors and Institutions (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, forthcoming 2020), at 29-30 of
the manuscript.
121
Société des Acadiens et Acadiennes du Nouveau-Brunswick Inc. v. Canada, [2008] S.C.J.
No. 15, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 383, 2008 SCC 15 (S.C.C.); Canada (Commissioner of Official Languages)
v. Canada (Department of Justice), [2001] F.C.J. No. 431, 194 F.T.R. 181, 2001 FCT 239 (F.C.).
See Johanne Poirier, “Fédéralisme coopératif et droits linguistiques au Canada: peut-on
‘contractualiser’ le droit des minorités ?” in Alain-G. Gagnon & Pierre Noreau, eds.,
Constitutionnalisme, droits et diversité: Mélanges en l’honneur de José Woehrling (Montréal:
Thémis, 2017) 317. In some cases, the fact that minorities are not part of the “contract” concluded
between executives leaves them without a remedy if governmental parties modify programs and
funding that affect them and which were structured through intergovernmental agreements: see
Fédération des francophones de la Colombie-Britannique v. Canada (Employment and Social
Development), [2018] F.C.J. No. 534, [2019] 1 F.C.R. 243 (F.C.) (leave to appeal to F.C.A. granted).
122
See, for instance, Pineview Poultry Products Ltd. v. Canada, [1994] F.C.J. No. 78,
[1994] 2 F.C. 475 (F.C.).
123
Currently, the Supreme Court is confronted with a bilateral agreement between British
Columbia and the federal order through which they respectively accept to submit to taxation from
each other in terms that seem to contradict s. 125 of the Constitution Act, 1982. The question —
raised by a third party — was whether the agreement actually applied to it. This is a case of
“properly incorporated” agreement (and of the status of Crown corporations). But fundamentally, it
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5. The Dualist Sword Doubles Up as a Shield for ParaConstitutional Creativity
The prefix “para” has two distinct etymological origins. In Latin,
“para” or “paro” means “against” or ‟counter” (as in “parasol”) while in
Greek ‟pará” signifies “on the side”, ‟on the margin” (as in
“parallel”).124 Both are relevant in the present context. Paraconstitutional engineering may allow both the development of policies
and governance structures that run alongside the official one, in the “nonlegal” world of politics (Greek pará). Or this institutional creativity may
actually give rise to arrangements that contradict constitutional norms
(Latin para).
It is a banal truism that the Canadian Constitution, at least in its
institutional dimensions, is outdated, and that modifying it by following
proper amendment procedures is so arduous as to become illusory. The
2014 Senate reform and Supreme Court Act references have emphasized
the importance of the formal amending formula for the constitutional
order and the stability of the federation. They “outlawed” legislative
attempts (by definition, unilateral) to modify fundamental federal
institutions.125 This, paradoxically, has led the federal order to adopt
informal means regarding the selection process in both the Senate126 and
the Supreme Court,127 and more recently, to the conclusion of an
also raises the question of the intrinsic validity of such an executive agreement: see British Columbia
Investment Management Corporation, [2018] B.C.J. No. 190, 2018 BCCA 47 (B.C.C.A.). The case
was heard by the Supreme Court on May 13, 2019.
124
See Anne-Emmanuelle Bourgaux, “La Belgique, État failli ou fédération… parafédérale? Le comité de concertation comme illustration des jeux du droit” in Johanne Poirier &
Nicolas Levrat, eds., Le fédéralisme coopératif comme terrain de jeu du droit, Special Issue, (2018)
18
Fédéralisme
et
Régionalisme,
online:
<https://popups.uliege.be/13743864/index.php?id=1768#tocto1n1>; Munungu & Poirier, at 920-21 and 928-31.
125
Catherine Mathieu & Patrick Taillon, “Aux frontières de la modification
constitutionnelle: le caractère para-constitutionnel de la réforme du Sénat canadien” (2013) 5
R.Q.D.C. 7; Kate Glover, “Hard Amendment Cases in Canada”, in Richard Albert, Xenophon
Contiades & Alkmene Fotiadu, eds., The Foundations and Traditions of Constitutional Amendment
(Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2017), 285-91.
126
An advisory Board was set up to recommend candidates. While instituted by an order in
council, it is an “informal” process: Senate of Canada, First Report on the Senate Nomination
Advisory Board (December 2016); The Advisory Committee was instituted by an order-in-council:
Mandate of the Independent Advisory Board for Senate Appointments and terms and conditions of
appointment of members, Order in Council PC 2016-0011, January 19, 2016, online (html):
<https://orders-in-council.canada.ca/attachment.php?attach=31695&lang=en>.
127
An Advisory Committee was also set up to recommend candidates. While also instituted
by order-in-council (Mandate of the Independent Advisory Board for Supreme Court of Canada
Advisory Board, Order in Council PC 2016-0693, July 29, 2016, online (html): <https://orders-in-
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intergovernmental agreement between Ottawa and Québec about the
selection process for Québec judges on the Court.128
In short, “hard” constitutional orthodoxy has led to “soft” paraconstitutional engineering. The point here is not to canvass all the means
through which actors engage in “para-constitutional” ingenuity (or to
criticize the result of this institutional dexterity). In various guises, this
happens in other political regimes, particularly federal ones, where
“negotiated” norms are intuitively more frequent.129 Nor is it to survey in
detail different means through which agreements may contribute to this
phenomenon in Canada.130 The objective is to reflect on how the 2018
Securities Reference uses parliamentary sovereignty to protect at least
some of these collaborative innovations.
Section 2.2. of the MOA provides that:
In entering into this MOA and participating in the Cooperative System,
each of the Participating Jurisdictions is addressing matters within its
constitutional jurisdiction and is neither surrendering nor impairing any
of its jurisdiction, with respect to which it remains sovereign.

For the Supreme Court, this section indicated that the intention of the
parties was “to establish a unified and cooperative system for the
regulation of capital markets in Canada in a manner that accords with
the constitutional division of powers”.131 While this may be their
intention, the inclusion of such a clause in an intergovernmental
agreement has no bearing on an eventual ruling on the division of
council.canada.ca/attachment.php?attach=32437&lang=en>), the qualification criteria (notably the
controversial ‟Functional bilingualism” requirement) were all established informally: see
https://pm.gc.ca/en/news/backgrounders/2016/08/04/mandate-letter-members-independent-advisoryboard-supreme-court).
128
Arrangement concerning the appointment process to fill the seat that will be left vacant
on the Supreme Court of Canada following the departure of Justice Clément Gascon, March 15
2019, online (pdf): <https://pm.gc.ca/en/news/backgrounders/2019/05/15/arrangement-concerningappointment-process-fill-seat-will-be-left> (accessed June 25, 2019).
129
On the “para-constitutional” function of intergovernmental relations in federal systems,
see Poirier & Saunders, “Conclusions”, at 490-94. On the myriads of ways of altering constitutional
orders: see Xenophon Contiades & Alkmene Fotiadou, “Models of constitutional change” in
Xenophon Contiades, ed., Engineering Constitutional Change: A Comparative Perspective on
Europe, Canada and the USA (Abingdon: Routledge, 2013) 438; Arthur Benz & César Colino,
“Constitutional Change in Federations — A Framework for Analysis” (2011) 21 Regional &
Federal Studies 381.
130
See Johanne Poirier & Jesse Hartery, “Modifier la constitution par la bande — et par
contrat: la fonction para-constitutionnelle des ententes intergouvernementales”, forthcoming in
Patrick Taillon & Marc Verdussen, eds., La modification constitutionnelle dans tous ses états —
Expériences belge, canadienne et européenne (Brussels: Bruylant, 2020).
131
2018 Securities Reference, at para. 22.
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powers: “Legislative jurisdiction cannot be assumed or be given by
consent.” 132 Nor can federal partners decide, between themselves,
whether what they are doing is consistent with the division of powers, or
their “sovereignty” in particular. This is truly the domain of courts. This
type of clause is not unusual in intergovernmental agreements and may
actually indicate that parties are conscious that what they are doing is
constitutionally, if not dubious, at least “creative”.
We saw earlier that “cooperative federalism” has hardly touched the
“maximalist” conception of parliamentary sovereignty in the Supreme
Court’s jurisprudence. In the CAP Reference and in the Long-Gun
registry decision, parliamentary sovereignty was used as a “sword”
which reinstated the full autonomy of federal partners, who could act in a
unilateral fashion. The fall-out of uncooperative action was held to be of
a political nature, not one for courts to take into consideration. In the
2018 Securities Reference, the Supreme Court turned its maximalist
conception of parliamentary sovereignty — this mighty weapon of
dualist federalism — into a “shield” to protect cooperative
arrangements.133
Clearly, the “pan-Canadian” securities regulation scheme was ably
drafted. Astutely, parties did not incorporate the voting scheme into the
respective legal orders of the various participants. At this stage, we are
left with a complex scheme which transforms the constitutional
landscape in relation to capital markets, which will only be without
“legal” effect if the parties choose to call it into question. Some “rich”
provinces will influence the legislative action of other provinces, with
Ottawa as an actor in the plot. This might very well be a positive
outcome from a policy perspective. And a realistic solution, given the
huge resource discrepancies between provinces. But it is problematic
from a constitutional perspective.
The message sent by the 2018 Securities Reference is that cooperative
arrangements which may temper with formal constitutional norms or
architecture should be outlined in a non-incorporated intergovernmental
agreement, rather than in legislation. Such agreements are not subject to
three readings, parliamentary committee review, simultaneous drafting
132

Nova Scotia, per Fauteux J., at 58; see also Taschereau J., at 39-40.
This was also the reasoning of the B.C. Court of Appeal in response to the argument that
the Nisga’a Final Agreement was introducing a third order of government through a treaty
implemented through parallel legislation. This, it was argued by opponents of the agreement,
amounted to an abdication of power by both the province and the federal order: House of Sga’snism
v. Canada (Attorney General), [2013] B.C.J. No. 179, 2013 BCCA 49 (B.C.C.A.).
133
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into both French and English (in the case of federal and several
provincial cases) or publication. In addition, any problematic content
might — at worse — be found to be “without effect” in law, while being
undoubtedly highly effective in practice.134 This is an invitation to — de
facto — do indirectly what cannot be done directly: use an
intergovernmental agreement (rather than legislation) and remain vague
in the legislation that is part of the “normative network”. The concrete
result will be the same.
In sum, the 2018 Securities Reference is an invitation for the
legislative — and mostly executive — branches to engage in paraconstitutional engineering behind the screen of parliamentary
sovereignty.

IV. CONCLUSION
The Canadian federal structure remains fundamentally dualist, even
as, over time, the practice of federalism has given way to a multitude of
intergovernmental arrangements. This evolution is supported by a strong
judicial trend which has put very few restraints on the way federal
partners structure their relations, including through executive interdelegation, legislation by reference, the creation of agencies, or the
adoption of intergovernmental agreements. More recently, “cooperative
federalism” has also been mobilized by courts to revisit — not in a
systematic way — interpretive doctrines of the division of powers to
encourage legislative overlap in order to facilitate coordinated,
executive-level policy-making in the country.
There is no denying that the judicial endorsement of cooperative
federalism has contributed to the incremental — and often implicit —
transformation of the dominant conception of federalism. A structurally
dualistic federal system has, in a gradual and ad hoc manner, become a
partially pan-Canadian administrative regime. Yet, while the Supreme
Court has encouraged cooperation, it has resisted imposing on federal
partners any duty to cooperate or to act in good faith in their
intergovernmental dealings. It hails cooperation but does not castigate
non-cooperation. Whatever collaborative scheme is elaborated by the
executive branch of the different orders of government — sometimes
with the input of their respective legislatures — the Court has
134

saw above.

And, for some, even be entirely immunized from judicial and constitutional review, as we

(2020) 94 S.C.L.R. (2d)

2018 PAN-CANADIAN SECURITIES REGULATION

119

conceptualized parliamentary sovereignty as always allowing legislatures
to unilaterally put an end to the arrangement or legislate in contradiction
with it.
Parliamentary sovereignty as a “sword” is not as bad as it sounds. It is
an important instrument of representative democracy. Beyond a certain
number of constitutional limits, elected assemblies may legislate in a
way that reflects the electorate’s presumed preferences. Moreover, it
clearly protects the autonomy of federal partners, their capacity to adopt
their “own” (auto) “laws” (“nomos”) without interference from other
orders. As such, it is not antithetical to federalism. But it is clearly an
instrument of dualist federalism.
The 2018 Securities Reference offered another opportunity to revisit
the interplay between parliamentary sovereignty and federalism. The
Court relied on its “maximalist” conception of parliamentary sovereignty
to salvage part of a cooperative arrangement that — paradoxically —
seemed to fetter the sovereignty of participating provinces. Individual
legislatures may always autonomously legislate in a fashion that
contradicts commitments made by the executive branches, even when
“legislating oneself out” has become highly impracticable and
improbable as a result of those commitments. In ruling that the potential
de jure use of the “sword” allows for constitutional tolerance of de facto
limitations in legislative autonomy, the Court crafted a “shield” for
interlocking pan-Canadian schemes. Such a result was accomplished
without reference to a caveat raised by the majority in the Long-Gun
Registry Decision that such a maximalist conception of parliamentary
sovereignty might not apply in the case of a “truly interlocking federalprovincial legislative framework”.135 Yet it would be difficult to find a
more closely interwoven partnership than the regime which gave rise to
the 2018 Securities Reference.
Is parliamentary sovereignty as a (shield) such a bad thing? The
Court’s approach partakes of a long-standing judicial trend that
minimizes constitutional impediments to cooperative arrangements in the
formally dualist federation. To the extent that some members of the
federation agree to coordinate the exercise of their respective
competences, why should others resist? And mostly, why should courts
object?
135
Québec (Attorney General) v. Canada (Attorney General), [2015] S.C.J. No. 14, [2015] 1
S.C.R. 693, 2015 SCC 14 at para. 4 (S.C.C.). The four-judge minority had considered the
arrangement relating to the Long-Gun Registry to constitute such an integrated partnership.
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The Supreme Court has suggested that efficiency may somewhat
compensate for more traditional modes of administrative accountability
and transparency.136 Writing about the 2018 Securities Reference, Paul
Daly salutes the fact that, at least by validating this type of scheme, the
Court may encourage political actors to publicize their agreements, thus
limiting their opacity.137 This may be so. There are indisputable
advantages to collaborative action between federal partners. In this
context, we can understand — and even support — judicial tolerance to
schemes which informally alter the dualist federal architecture.
Additionally, from a political perspective, Alain-G. Gagnon argues —
somewhat counter-intuitively — that “executive federalism” may
actually promote democracy since it grants a voice to the diversity of
polities that make up a federation, particularly a pluri-national one.138
This argument is compelling. But again, it does not detract from the fact
that the executive-heavy dimensions of cooperative federalism have the
effect of reinforcing the executive branches. Should executives acting
together escape various forms of oversight to which they are —
constitutionally and legitimately — subject in their respective,
autonomous, orders?
Indeed, without denying the reality and advantages of a very dense
practice of intergovernmental relations and institutions or the undeniable
advantages of coordinated action, protecting cooperation at all costs
(while not condemning non-cooperation) does raise a number of
concerns.
First, it contributes to the phenomenon of para-constitutional
engineering in place of open constitutional reform. One of the messages
of the 2018 Securities Reference is essentially that federal partners may
reshape the federation as they see fit, on the margins of amendment
procedures. This may not be so negative given the difficulty of
proceeding with formal constitutional reforms. We may, however, query
whether enabling the executives to act jointly but “informally”, through

136
British Columbia (Milk Board) v. Grisnich, [1995] S.C.J. No. 35, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 895 at
para. 30 (S.C.C.), at para. 30.
137
Paul Daly, “Parliamentary Sovereignty and Intergovernmental Agreements: Reference re PanCanadian Securities Regulation, 2018 SCC 48”, Nov. 13, 2018; available at: Administrative Law Matters:
www.administrativelawmatters.com/blog/2018/11/13/parliamentary-sovereignty-and-intergovernmentalagreements-reference-re-pan%E2%80%91canadian-securities-regulation-2018-scc-48.
138
A.-G. Gagnon, “Executive Federalism and the Exercise of Democracy” in The Case for
Multinational Federalism: Beyond the All-Encompassing Nation (London: Routledge, 2010) at 67-87.

(2020) 94 S.C.L.R. (2d)

2018 PAN-CANADIAN SECURITIES REGULATION

121

“contract-like” instruments, does not contribute to the self-fulfilling
dogma that constitutional reforms are, for the most part, elusive.
Second, the cooperative scheme at issue in the 2018 Securities
Reference encouraged the elaboration of asymmetrical arrangements,
which, again, deviate from the formal equality between provinces. As
such, asymmetry can be rather healthy in a diverse federation,
particularly a pluri-national one. Generally, in Canadian practice,
asymmetrical solutions have been developed in a “vertical” and
“bilateral” fashion: Ottawa adapting programs, funding, etc., to the
particular situation of distinct provinces. This time, some provinces agree
to have other ones — those with “major capital markets” — to have a
dominant voice in the way provincial jurisdiction over securities will be
managed. This may be simple realpolitik, given huge disparities in
capacity between provinces. But it is cause for reflection if such powerbased asymmetry is to inspire other complex intergovernmental
machinery.139
Third, complex intergovernmental schemes, which derogate from the
formal dualist architecture, raise accountability issues. The securities
regime is no different. This may be an inevitable consequence of
cooperation. The price to pay for coordinated action. Parliamentary
scrutiny is designed in a parallel, dualist mode. It is ill-adapted to joint
executive decision-making.140 Ministerial responsibility is not designed
139

Provinces with “major markets” play a decisive role in the decision-making process (see
Part II.1 The Pan-Canadian Securities Scheme: A Complex Normative Network and Part II.2 The
Role of the Multilateral Council of Ministers in Altering Provincial Legislation). The same goes for
their participation in governance. Hence, the “Implementation team” is composed of a federal
representative, as well as one from each of the “major markets”: Section 5.2 Memorandum of
Agreement Regarding the Cooperative Capital Market Regulatory System, signed between July 20
and August 4, 2016, online (pdf): Cooperative Capital Markets Regulatory System, online:
<http://ccmr-ocrmc.ca/wp-content/uploads/moa-23092016-en.pdf> (accessed June 20, 2019),
s. 10.2. The same goes for the institution of “deputy regulators” which only some participating
provinces will have a chance to have: id., s. 9.2(b). While this may well be efficient, it does reinforce
the idea (and practice) that some are more equal than others.
140
Peter Hogg, who acted as counsel in Reference re Agricultural Products Marketing
Association, [1978] S.C.J. No. 58, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 1198 (S.C.C.), candidly attests that in that case —
and many arrangements elaborated since — it is impossible to trace “the lines of responsibility” for
the decisions taken by the cooperative organ: Hogg, “Constitutional Law of Canada”, s. 14.4(b). On
the challenges that intergovernmental relations pose to accountability, see Donald V. Smiley, “An
Outsider’s Observations of Federal-Provincial Relations Among Consenting Adults” in Richard
Simeon, ed., Confrontation and Collaboration: Intergovernmental Relations in Canada Today
(Toronto: Institute of Public Administration of Canada, 1979), at 105-106; Richard Simeon & Amy
Nugent, “Parliamentary Canada and Intergovernmental Canada: Exploring the Tensions” in Herman
Bakvis & Grace Skogstad, eds., Canadian Federalism: Performance, Effectiveness and Legitimacy,
3d ed. (Don Mills: Oxford University Press, 2012) 59; Gordon DiGiacomo, “The Democratic
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for interlocked executive decision-making.141 Access-to-Information
legislation and budgetary controls by Auditors-General, for example, are
all designed along dualist modes and are ill-suited to labyrinthine,
multilateral arrangements. Similarly, complex jurisdictional issues arise
regarding the judicial review of joint administrative action or decision by
intergovernmental agencies.142 There is — quite simply — a clash
between intertwined practice and formal institutions on the democratic
accountability front. There can be “collateral damage” when institutions
which constrain and control executive action — so central to the modern
rule of law in the “administrative state” — are not adapted to the
“intergovernmental administrative state”.
In sum, the complex, polycentric, fluid and fundamentally political
character of intergovernmental relations likely explains “benevolent
constitutional scrutiny”.143 A “robust federation” does require a strong
judicial branch, but this is not the only important safeguard.144

Content of Intergovernmental Agreements in Canada” (Regina: Saskatchewan Institute of Public
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In this context, “shielding” intergovernmental arrangements from
“constitutional attacks” may be warranted. However, such a deference
bulwark should be kept within bounds. It should not, for instance, lead to
the immunization of intergovernmental agreements from constitutional
review. Not because parties to the agreements may not be able to defend
themselves in the political arena, but because of their impact on third
parties, notably citizens, and on the overall federal architecture.

